The paper outlines parallels between the processes of secularization and secularity in the West, as interpreted by José Casanova and Charles Taylor, and Islamism as a modern social and political phenomenon. It focuses on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's history and ideas and specifically on a number of public documents detailing its social and political vision. I argue that if we define 'secularization' not only as the weakening of religious belief, but as the institutional differentiation of modern state structures and the marginalization of religion; and 'secularity' as the process whereby faith becomes one option among others and religion becomes an identifiable set of beliefs seen as guidelines for reform, the Brotherhood, similarly to other Islamist entities, is a phenomenon of a 'secular age'.
Introduction
It may appear counter-intuitive to describe the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptcommitted since its inception in 1928 to the Islamization of Egypt and Muslim society in general -as being a secular entity in any shape or form. However, it is my contention in this paper that 'Islamist' can only be juxtaposed to 'secular' in such stark and simple fashion if the latter is defined solely as the decline of religious belief; and that, if we take on board the more complex meanings of the term -'secularization' as the process of institutional and functional differentiation of modern state structures and the resultant marginalization of religion and 'secularity' as the process by which faith becomes one option among others -the Brotherhood must be seen, if not as a secular movement, at the very least as a phenomenon of a secular age. Gregory Starrett argues that 'the secular's unfixedness is one of its essential features' and that its 'usefulness as an analytical concept is deeply suspect' (Starrett, 2010, p. 628) . Philip Gorski and Ateş Altınordu maintain that we must 'firmly renounce any pretenses to fixing a correct meaning [of the secularization concept] once and for all ' (2008, p. 75) . These approaches, and the concept of 'multiple secularities' -analogous in some ways to 'multiple modernities' -which addresses the manner in which secularity is variously negotiated in specific historical and social settings (Burchardt et al., 2015) , provide the backdrop for my argument in this paper. However, even though my starting point is that secularity and secularization (and secularism, though this is not my subject 1 ) follow diverse paths across history and around the world, my argument ultimately highlights similarity rather than difference across societies and world regions within the modern condition. I follow Casanova's call to 'historicize and contextualize our categories and adopt a more global perspective' (Casanova, 2003, p. 17) (though I disagree with him on the issue of Islam, as I will clarify). But I also take on board his view that, even if the traditional model of secularization no longer offers a plausible account of developments outside Europe, for the United States and the rest of the world (2003, p. 17) , it is still useful as 'an analytical framework for a comparative research agenda which aims to examine the historical transformation of all world religions under conditions of modern structural differentiation, as long as the outcome of this transformation is not predetermined by the theory ' (2003, p. 23 ).
The paper demonstrates how processes and structures of secularity and secularization have shaped the worldview and ideology of a seminal Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It sets the Brotherhood alongside the European/Christian/Western experience -not using it, however, as the theoretical framework or 'ideal type' against which the Brotherhood case is to be measured -and concludes that they are not dissimilar, and that the idea of multiple secularities and secularizations should not be pushed so far as to obscure elements of commonality across modern societies. The paper draws on two major thinkers on secularity and secularization in the European/Christian/Western world, José Casanova and Charles
Taylor. They are not the only historians or sociologists of secularity and secularization in the West, of course, but they dominate the field -Taylor in particular has been described as 'one of the leading thinkers of our time' (Warner et al., 2010, p. 1) . They are also relevant to my argument in that they have both also touched on Islam, mostly to highlight its points of contrast with the West and Christianity. 2 I maintain that these points of contrast may not be as sharp as Casanova and Taylor have suggested.
Secularization and secularity in the West through the work of José Casanova and Charles Taylor
José Casanova argues that secularization theory consists of three hypothesesdifferentiation, privatization, and decline -each of which must be treated as separate, and only one of which, differentiation, is plausible (Casanova, 1994, pp. 20, 211 ; see also Casanova, 2011 ). Casanova's major work, Public religions in the modern world, published in 1994, deals with case studies drawn from the Christian world (1994, pp. 5-6) . It argues that it had become clear by the 1980s that differentiation and the loss of societal functions of religion do not necessarily entail its privatization, let alone its decline. The main fallacy of secularization theory, according to Casanova, was 'the confusion of historical processes of secularization proper with the alleged and anticipated consequences which those processes were supposed to have upon religion' (Casanova, 1994, p. 19 ).
The aspect of Casanova's argument most relevant to this paper is his assertion that, whatever the dispute about its consequences, the 'core of the theory of secularization, the thesis of the differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres from religious institutions and norms, remains valid ' (1994, p. 6) ; and that secular differentiation 'remains a structural trend that serves to define the very structure of modernity' (Casanova, 1994, p. 39) . The theory of secularization is a sub-theory of general theories of differentiation, either of the evolutionary or universal kind proposed by Émile Durkheim or the historically specific or Western modernization theory of Max Weber (Casanova, 1994, pp. 17-18) . Differentiation entails that 'the state and the economy, as well as other major cultural and institutional spheres of society -science, education, law, art -develops its own institutional autonomy, as well as its intrinsic functional dynamics. Religion itself is constrained not only to accept the modern principle of structural differentiation of the secular spheres but also to follow the same dynamic and to develop an autonomous differentiated sphere of its own' (Casanova, 1994, p. 212) .
Charles Taylor expounds on the meaning of 'the secular' in the history of the West in his book A secular age, a major work which, since its publication in 2007, has molded debates on the subject both in public philosophy and the social sciences.
Secularity, as experienced in the West, consists of three aspects. 'Secularity 1' refers to 'common institutions and practices -most obviously, but not only, the state' (Taylor, 2007a, p. 1) . The modern Western state is free from the connection with faith or God, churches are separate from political structures and religion or its absence is largely a private matter. Public spaces -which include science, the market, politics, the artshave been 'emptied of God' and 'the considerations we act on are internal to the "rationality" of each sphere'. This emptying of religion from autonomous social spheres is compatible, however, with the majority of people still believing in God (Taylor, 2007a, p. 2) . The second meaning of secularity according to Taylor, 'secularity 2', is 'the falling off of religious belief and practice, in people turning away from God, and no longer going to Church' (Taylor, 2007a, p. 2) . This is what people most think about when they define our times as secular but must be distinguished from 'secularity 3', which focuses on conditions of belief. Taylor's book focuses on secularity in that third sense. It traces the evolution of Western societies from a situation, in 1500, where it was virtually impossible not to believe in God (where belief was the 'default option') (Taylor, 2007a, p. 12) to one, in 2000, where 'faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility among others' (Taylor, 2007a, p. 3) and many of us find not believing in God easy and even inescapable (Taylor, 2007a, p. 25) . Now unbelief has become the 'default' position (Taylor, 2007a, p. 3).
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Secularity 3, which pertains to conditions of belief, is characterized by a number of inter-related developments. Taylor argues that there emerged, in 'Latin Christendom' following the 'Dark Ages', what he calls the 'buffered self' (Taylor, 2007a, pp. 37-42) which entailed the creation of a boundary between inside (thought) and outside (nature, the physical). It comes about through 'the replacement of a cosmos of spirits and forces by a mechanistic universe' and gives us 'a sense of power, of capacity, in being able to order our world and ourselves' (Taylor, 2007a, p. 300) . This development gave 'unprecedented primacy to the individual' and, as a result, society gradually came to be conceived as made up of individuals (Taylor, 2007a, p. 146) . In earlier societies there had been an inability to imagine the self outside a particular context, whereas now the abstract question of emigrating or changing religion became possible (Taylor, 2007a, p. 149) . By the second half of the twentieth century there arose in Western societies 'a generalized culture of "authenticity" or expressive individualism' (Taylor, 2007a, p. 299 ).
Taylor writes, that 'It has often been noted how secularization went along with an intensification of religious faith'. During the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in Europe, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, religion became a matter of intense personal decision (Taylor, 2007a, p. 143) . There was a gradual sorting out in experience 'by which it became possible to relate to certain realities as purely "natural", and disintricate them from the transcendent; whereby it eventually became possible to see the immediate surroundings of our lives as existing on this "natural" plane…'. This sorting out was compatible with belief in God and was even 'accompanied by a more conscious and zealous dedication to God' (Taylor, 2007a, p. 143) .
The primacy of the individual and the intensification of faith were inextricably linked with the urge to reform which took, in late mediaeval -early modern Europe, the form of 'a drive to make over the whole society to higher standards' (Taylor, 2007a, pp. 62-63) . Reforms rested on the idea that each individual will face judgment upon death and encouraged the spread of a new spirituality, coupled with the break-up of traditional forms of life (Taylor, 2007a, pp. 67-69) . There was an emphasis on imitating the virtues of saints rather than venerating their bones (Taylor, 2007a, pp. 72 and 76) .
Early modern clerical elites, in seeking to enforce standards of piety and orthodoxy, 'came to define the phenomenon of belief in a new way that was sharp enough to make declarations of explicit unbelief -atheism -far more prominent than in earlier times' (Warner et al., 2010, p. 16) . Reform movements were linked to 'a project of producing purer religion and demanding more widespread lay adherence to high (even monastic) standards of purity. The effort to "cleanse" Christianity of folk beliefs and practices was one part of this story. So was the rise of new morality governed by self-discipline but also ever-proliferating rules…' (Warner et al., 2010, p 15 spheres. I finally turn to methodological issues and set out the rationale behind the selection of the primary sources.
'Islam', Islamism and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
In their works of 1994 and 2007 respectively, Casanova and Taylor focus mainly on the Western world but they make intriguing allusions to the non-West, and specifically to 'Islam' and 'Islamic societies'. 4 Taylor argues that, outside the West, 'almost all other contemporary societies (e.g., Islamic countries, India and Africa)' -and people in the rest of human history -do not live in a secular age (Taylor, 2007a, p. 1) . When he discusses secularity in the third sense, of belief being one option among others, he writes that 'Clear contrast cases today would be the majority of Muslim societies, or the milieu in which the vast majority of Indians live in' (Taylor, 2007a, p. 3) . In his 1994 book, Casanova argues that Islam is 'the unique historical case' which was born both as a religious and political community and that the umma (community of believers) saw itself most of the time as both religious and political community. He qualifies this by adding that it is wrong to say that in Islam religious and political spheres were not differentiated and that institutional separation did exist, even though the foundational myth that religious and political spheres were merged remains important (Casanova, 1994, p. 48) . Elsewhere, Casanova argues that 'we need to go against exceptionalisms as much as against invidious misleading contrasts between the secular liberal West and the religious fundamentalist "Rest"' (Casanova, 2003, p. 23 Egypt but the greatest challenge to the Brotherhood was presented in the 1990s by the Gama'a Islamiyah, which opposed its gradualist politics (Dalacoura, 2011, pp. 113-116) . In terms of status and popularity, however, the Brotherhood continued to be the al-Anani, 2016, pp. 65, 120) . If, despite these consciously and purposefully 'religious' intentions and policies, the Brotherhood is still defined and shaped in significant aspects of its ideology and orientation by secular realities and conditions, the paper's argument will be all the more convincing.
In an article on the ideational evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood between 1984 , Sumita Pahwa (2013 shows how the movement has adapted to democratic and secular ideas by reframing them in religious terms. This process of 'secular translation' has resulted in a hybrid, 'secularized' Islamism, according to Pahwa. The Brotherhood's political mission has moved away from applying a preconceived religious project to an emphasis on achieving the public good for
Muslims. The leadership thus justified participation in a 'secular' political order that past leaders had treated as too corrupt (Pahwa, 2013, pp. 192-193) . They developed a more 'secular' proposition about the benefits of sharia (Islamic law) 'from one that emphasized the authority and sovereignty of religion over public life to one that argued that shariah would uphold popular rights and the public good'. Religious law was framed as 'valuable in achieving "secular" functional goals like law and order, rather than simply religious duty' (Pahwa, 2013, pp. 194-195) . Pahwa suggests that the reason why the Brotherhood's ideology has become 'secularized' is that the Brotherhood has undergone a process of political adaptation.
Pahwa's argument helps me spell out an important point with regards to my own. She offers an alternative explanation to mine for the secularization of the Brotherhood's ideas; my starting point, purpose and conclusion are different from hers in significant ways. Although Pahwa's argument is also about secularity and secularization in so far as they shape the Brotherhood's ideas and ideology, she juxtaposes religion and the secular, seeing them as distinct and even antithetical; whereas I am suggesting that religion, or at least religious revivalism in the form of Islamism, is shaped within the boundaries and structures created by a secular (material) reality. That secular reality defines the Brotherhood's worldview as well as the way it functions and operates. Islamic religious 'revival' is a product (Roy, 2010, p. 2) or a phenomenon (Zubaida, 2005, pp. 445-446) , of secularization, not its opposite.
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The analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood below is based on a wide-ranging evaluation of the movement through secondary sources but also on primary materials, namely a number of Muslim Brotherhood public statements which, taken together, put forward comprehensively the Brotherhood's proposed alternative Islamic order. They follow her lead in delving in them more extensively than in the other documents (Wickham, 2013, pp. 104-107, pp. 124-126) .
The documents were selected because they encapsulate the Brotherhood's vision of an Islamic social and political order in its totality, as an alternative to the secular order. They constituted major 'events' and were the object of extensive public debate in Egypt (particularly the 2007 political party platform). It is through these documents -which represented the movement's involvement in the political fray and engagement with public debates about the future of Egypt -that it is possible to explore the degree to which the movement is shaped by the processes of modernity and state formation. Clearly, there exists a larger body of formal and informal publications, statements, interviews, and other pronouncements by the Brotherhood (Mellor, 2018) .
However, it would be unfeasible for the purposes of this paper to cover such an enormous body of material which, in any case, most often deals with more particular aspects of the proposed social and political order and a variety of other issues (personal, theological) not relevant to the argument.
Given the plurality of views within the Brotherhood and the profound tensions between its various internal ideological strands, it is possible to object that the documents I focus on in the sections below were distributed for public consumption whereas documents internal to the movement, are more representative of their 'true'
thinking. However, the charge of dissimulation would be more relevant to the Brotherhood's positions on democracy and pluralism, which is not my subject here.
Furthermore, with so many different strands and conflicting views behind the scenes, it is impossible to treat some views as 'truer' or more representative of the Brotherhood than others (Wickham, 2013, p. 186) . The Brotherhood's formal public statements, however, even though they emerged through a process of internal contestation and compromise, are indisputable owned by the movement.
The selection of documents for consideration in the paper was also determined in light of the changing internal balances between the Brotherhood's multiple factions.
I focus on the public statements of the movement in the 2000s and 2010s and not before for reasons linked with its ideological evolution. 6 Two internal conflicts run through the Brotherhood in its post-Nasser period. First, between the proponents of dawa who argue that the movement should focus on religious missionary activity, and those who want it to play a more openly political role. Second, between conservatives and reformists whose disagreements centre mainly on the issue of democracy and pluralism.
There is considerable consensus among analysts of the Brotherhood that the conservatives gained the upper hand from the late 1990s onwards (Wickham, 2013, pp. 120-153; al-Anani 2016, pp. 146-147) even though, as just mentioned, the internal divisions rumbled on. Even during periods of conservative ascendancy, however, the Brotherhood's public documents indicate that secular structures and secularizing processes shape the movement's ideology, which lends weight to my argument.
Institutional and functional differentiation and the emptying of public space of
God
Secularity in Taylor and even foreign policy (Bayat, 2007, pp. 136-186) .
The apparent pervasiveness of religion, however, obscures the deeper reality of secularization in the sense of institutional and functional differentiation, in terms similar to those described by Casanova, which has occurred in the Middle East in general and Egypt in particular. In different ways and from discrete disciplinary perspectives, Marshall Hodgson (1977) and Sami Zubaida (2003 Zubaida ( , 2005 , among others, have shown that, with the gradual introduction of the nation-state in the post-nineteenth century Middle East, a new set of extensive, if not all-powerful structures of authority came into being. Their emergence entailed the cutting off of religious authorities from social, educational, cultural and political spheres which they had previously been present in or in some cases even dominated. Religion was not abandoned necessarily but became 'compartmentalized' to particular corners of people's lives (Zubaida, 2005, pp. 440, 444) . In the most important area of law, secularization occurred because the modern nation-state vested itself with the sovereign right to legislate, further wresting authority away from religious authorities.
Despite the fact that, as pointed out above, in Egypt society and politics is infused with religious ideas, symbols and values, the logics which pervade the different areas of public life are secular. One would have expected the Muslim Brotherhood, which proposes to 'recapture' these areas of public life for Islam, to be suggesting a new, religious logic to be applied to each of them separately. However, as its public statements show, the Brotherhood has not been able to put forward such alternative religious logics and its proposals for an 'Islamization' of politics, the economy and culture remain at surface or rhetorical levels. Taylor who distinguishes between secularization in the sense of institutional or functional differentiation, and secularity (1), the emptying of public spaces of God, in the following way:
the fact that activity in a given sphere follows its own inherent rationality and doesn't permit of the older kind of faith-based norming doesn't mean that it cannot still be very much shaped by faith. Thus, an entrepreneur in a modern economy couldn't accommodate the mediaeval Church interdict on usury, but that wouldn't prevent a devout Calvinist from carrying on his business to the glory of God, giving much of the proceeds to charity, etc. Similarly, a modern doctor will not usually send her patient to touch a relic, but her vocation to medicine may be deeply grounded in her faith (Taylor, 2007a, pp. 425-426) .
In the passage, Taylor misses an important aspect of secularization theory which is crucial to my argument about the Brotherhood. It may indeed be the case that the doctor will see her faith as informing how she conducts her profession, and she may be ready to proclaim the strength of her belief from the rooftops while doing so. However, the doctor still has to operate within the rules of medical science when treating a patient: if she attempts to treat the patient by using relics she will lose her license. Furthermore, this is the case, not just in the West, but also according to the law (irrespective of whether it is properly applied or not) in all Middle Eastern states. In the Middle East, differentiation in the Weberian sense has occurred and this has caused more of an emptying of the public sphere of God (Taylor's secularity 1) than meets the eye: an appeal to God and the insignia of religion may prevail everywhere but religious logics do not pervade public spheres, despite persistent claims to the contrary.
Belief in God as 'one option among others' and the urge to reform
Egypt today, where (admitting to) religious unbelief -for the country's Coptic minority as well as the Muslim majority -is almost beyond the pale (Schielke, 2012) , appears to confirm Taylor's argument that in Muslim societies religious belief has not become one option (secularity 3), in the same way it has in Christian or post-Christian ones (Taylor, 2007a, p. 3) . However, here again appearances are deceptive. It is, indeed, the case that belief, not unbelief, is the 'default' position in Egypt and that belief has not 'fallen off'
as it has in the West (Taylor's secularity 2). However, belief has become one option among others in Egypt (secularity 3), albeit in a very specific manner: as the conscious adoption of intensive religiosity and becoming a set of identifiable objectives, to be deliberately pursued by the faithful individual.
As noted above, levels of religiosity in Egypt -from which the Brotherhood has benefited and to which, in turn, it has contributed -increased after the 1970s (Abdo, 2000) ; which indicates that great numbers of Egyptians opted to become more religious.
The contrast between the secular atmosphere of the 1950s and 1960s and the subsequent emergence of a public sphere infused with Islamic symbolism is vividly described by many observers of the Egyptian scene (Al Yafai, 2012) . In the 1960s, society and politics were dominated by 'secular conceptions, including Arab nationalism, Arab socialism and Marxism'; it was in the decade after the Arab defeat of 1967 that 'political
Islam emerged as an important force' (Flores, 1988, p. 27 ).
The characteristics of religious revivalism in Egypt have similarities with the phenomena described by Taylor as having happened in Europe (which were outlined in some detail in the first section of the paper): the intensification of religious faith in Egypt after the 1970s also occurred within the context of secularization. It entailed an emphasis on prayer, dress, ritual practice and the textually correct understanding of ritual; and the rendering of atheism/unbelief as something that could be 'identified' or 'declared' (and, as a corollary, combatted). It also involved the widespread belief that Egypt's laws should be in accordance with Islamic values and principles (Schielke, 2012, p. 303, and note 13, p. 318) . Faith is consciously (re)adopted and leads to the active pursuit of religious obligations in a purposeful and considered manner. It is the result of a personal, an individual decision.
The Muslim Brotherhood was part and parcel of the wider religious revivalism in Egypt. Its establishment in the 1920s can be seen as linked to the secularization process -discussed in the previous section -which transformed Egyptian state and society from the early nineteenth century (Mitchell, 1991) . The role of the individual is central in the movement's philosophy and world-view. From the start, the Brotherhood adopted a 'bottom up' strategy: Islamization would begin with the individual, spread upwards to society and eventually transform the state (Mitchell, 1993, p. 234; al-Anani, 2016) . Similarly to other Islamist groups in Egypt and the Middle East, the movement saw its ranks swell by members joining as a result of individual choice (even though joining may have been underpinned by a yearning for belonging to a group). The movement has been, typically, stronger in dynamic urban environments (Kupferschmidt, 1982; Mitchell, 1993, p. 329) This idea continues being at the core of the Brotherhood's purpose and message.
For the Brotherhood, reforming Islam involved the application of high standards to the faith. The implicit assumption here is that these standards exist 'outside' or independently of the believer, and that they can be identified by him or her. They can then be 'implemented' at either the personal or the collective level. Society is to be (Schacht, 1964, p. 101) . Modernist legislation 'does not merely restrict the field in which the sacred Law is applied in practice but interferes with the traditional form of this law itself' (Schacht, 1964, p. 3) . The Brotherhood's call for the laws of Egypt to be reformed along the lines of the sharia, and its implicit claim that it can achieve this reform if it takes over the reins of government, indicate that the Brotherhood has accepted and internalized the modern conception of state and law. The state envisaged in our program is the national constitutional Islamic modern democracy, based on Sharia (Islamic law) as a frame of reference. By its nature, Sharia nurtures aspects of faith, worship and morality, and also regulates various aspects of life for Muslims and their non-Muslim partners on the homeland. However, in some (few) cases, Sharia regulates these aspects through definitive texts with direct relevance and significance (Freedom and Justice Party, 2011, pp. 10-11) .
Some of these objectives were carried through to Egypt's 2012 constitution (Egyptian The above argument has broader significance for the viability, appeal and prospects of Islamism as a movement and an ideology. The Brotherhood's inability to offer distinct Islamic programmes or ideas in the spheres of the economy and politics, which continue being dominated by non-religious, internal logics and remain autonomous of religion (Casanova, 1994, p. 20) , renders the Islamist project unrealizable; it also explains the group's excessive concentration on a 'moral' agenda.
Olivier Roy has described this as 'the failure' of political Islam (Roy, 1994) and argued that it 'comes from the fact that it tried to compete with secularization on its own ground: the political sphere (nation, state, citizen, constitution, legal system). Attempts to politicize religion in this way always end up secularizing it, because it becomes mixed up with day-to-day politics…' In this sense, secularization 'has worked' (Roy, 2010, p. 2) . Bruce Lawrence, positing that the nation-state system is 'the inescapable political norm for all humankind', argues that fundamentalists 'must perform on a stage that they did not construct and which they cannot destroy' (Lawrence, 1989, p. 227) .
The second reason for describing the Brotherhood as a phenomenon of a secular age is that it treats 'Islam' as a set of beliefs to be put into practice by the believer who, in turn, opts to adhere to the faith on an individual basis. Reform is pursued along the lines of these beliefs, which are identifiable and treated as separate from the believer; they are used as criteria to 'improve standards'. The paper illustrated this point with reference, again, to the history and ideas of the movement and more specifically the extensive concentration of its various public documents on the subject of reform. The
Islamist project outlined in these documents, encapsulated in the slogan 'Islam is the solution' and the proclaimed goal of sharia, is conceived of as a blueprint for the ideal society and is to be actively implemented by the movement and its followers (the irony being that the tangible prescriptions for this ideal society have nothing much to do with religion, as we saw).
One implication of the above analysis is that there exist more commonalities, when it comes to secularity and secularization, between Western and Muslim-majority societies than Casanova and Taylor presume. This is not an assertion that they follow similar trajectories but that the stories have interesting parallels, stemming from these societies partaking in modernity's broader, worldwide trends. The conceptualization of religion as separate and distinct from the believer (the 'subject') and its 'objectification', which are implicit in the Brotherhood's approach and in Taylor's description of the idea of reform, have also been globalized (Mahmood, 2010, p. 283 ).
Referring to the West, Taylor argues that it is impossible to define the idea of 'secularization' in a precise or agreed on manner and numerous questions can be asked about its precise meaning (Taylor, 2007a, p. 427) . As already pointed out at the start of this analysis, there cannot be a universal agreed-upon definition of 'secularization' and 'secularity' and it is more helpful to think along the lines of 'multiple secularities' than one secular experience. Within the context of Western or European history as well, paths are varied. However, as Taylor claims, despite these uncertainties and caveats, most of us agree that 'something that deserves this title [secularization] has taken place in our civilization' (Taylor, 2007a, p. 426) .
This paper did not use the West experience as a measure to evaluate how secularization and secularity have shaped the Muslim Brotherhood, which would have been an exercise in crude Eurocentrism. Instead, the paper argued that the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Islamism more generally, are shaped by a historical experience of secularity and secularization which, although not identical to the Western one, has at least considerable commonalities with it. The wider implication of the paper's argument may be that, even in the thorny area of religion, modernity unifies human experience and the human condition to a greater extent than initially meets the eye.
Notes
1 My paper is not an enquiry about secularism as a political and ideological project. A connection between secularity, secularization and secularism is suggested by Talal Asad, who questions the liberal assumption that secularism protects civil freedoms from religious tyranny and argues that secularism, far from underpinning state neutrality and rational ethics, is in fact associated with the hegemonic project of the modern state (Asad, 2003, pp. 227-228, 255 ; see also Mahmood, 2006; Agrama, 2010; Scott, 2014; Hurd, 2007 Casanova (2003) , discusses the Muslim world from a global perspective on secularization, albeit briefly. Taylor (2007b) , is about Islam, tolerance and the clash of civilizations. I do not deal with these issues and therefore do not engage with these works. 3 Taylor explains 'how conditions of secularity have come to shape both contemporary belief and "unbelief"' alike'; the religious and the secular are not opposites but are co-constituted (Taylor, 2007a, p. 25; Warner et al., 2010, pp. 5, 8-9) . 4 I place 'Islam' and 'Islamic societies' in quotation marks because I find generalizing about them problematic. 5 See also note 3, above. 6 The Brotherhood's Charter, originally circulated in the 1930s and revised in the 1940s and 1990s, dealt with the movement's internal organization, not its ideology (Mitchell, 1993, p. 163; Wickham, 2013, pp. 127, 130) . On the documents of the 1980s see Hamid (2014, pp. 71-77) . On the documents of the 1990s see Hamid (2014, pp. 94-96) , Wickham (2013, pp. 69-70) and El-Ghobashy (2005, p. 383) .
